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Vagueness and Introspection∗
Denis Bonnay Paul E´gre´
Abstract
We compare three strategies to model the notion of vague knowl-
edge in epistemic logic. Williamson’s margin for error semantics
typically uses non-transitive Kripke structures, but invalidates the
principle of positive introspection. On the contrary, Halpern’s two-
dimensional semantics preserves the introspection principle, but using
more complex uncertainty relations that are transitive. We present a
modification of the standard epistemic semantics, which validates in-
trospection over one-dimensional non-transitive structures, and study
its correspondence with Halpern’s approach. While the semantics can
be seen as the diagonalization of an explicit two-dimensional seman-
tics, it affords a more intuitive representation of the uncertainty char-
acteristic of vague knowledge. We examine the implications of the
semantics concerning higher-order vagueness and the status of the
non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. We respond to a po-
tential objection against our approach by giving a dynamic model of
the way subjects with inexact knowledge make successive approxima-
tions of their margin of error.
1 Intransitivity and introspection
One central and debated aspect of the notion of inexact knowledge con-
cerns the non-transitivity of the relation of indiscriminability and how it
should be represented. On the epistemic account of vagueness put forward
by Williamson, the intransitivity of the relation of indiscriminability is pre-
sented as the main source for vagueness ([12]: 237). In [11] and in the
Appendix to [12], Williamson formulates a fixed margin for error semantics
for propositional modal logic in which the relation of epistemic uncertainty,
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1
based on a metric between worlds, is thus reflexive and symmetric, but non-
transitive and non-euclidian.1 An important consequence of Williamson’s
semantics is that it invalidates the principles of positive introspection (if I
know p, then I know that I know p) as well as negative introspection (if I
don’t know p, then I know that I don’t know p).
In an earlier paper [1], we argued against Williamson that models of in-
exact knowledge that preserve the introspection principles can sometimes be
desirable, and we presented a non-standard epistemic semantics for the no-
tion of inexact knowledge, in which non-transitive and non-euclidian Kripke
models can nevertheless validate positive as well as negative introspection.
In [5], Halpern also argued against Williamson that an adequate model of
vague knowledge need not invalidate the introspection principles, but fol-
lowing a different route. Instead of taking intransitivity as a primitive, and
proving that the introspection principles can be preserved for a logic with one
epistemic operator, as we did in [1], Halpern proposes a bimodal account of
inexact knowledge that preserves the introspection principles, and he shows
that there is a way to derive intransitivity. For Halpern, the intransitivity of
vague knowledge is more characteristic of our reports on what we perceive
than about our actual perception.
Despite these differences, one can establish a precise correspondence be-
tween Halpern’s semantics and the semantics presented in [1]. The object
of this paper is to spell out the details of this correspondence, and thus
to compare two strategies in order to keep together introspection and non-
transitivity. Like Halpern, but contra Williamson, we think it does make
sense to preserve the introspection principles within a logic of inexact knowl-
edge; unlike Halpern, but in agreement with Williamson, we are ready to
see non-transitivity as a property of perceptual knowledge proper. The di-
vergence with Halpern’s view is more conceptual than technical, however,
since we will see that we understand “perceptual” in a broader sense than
Halpern, in a way that encompasses what he calls “reports about percep-
tion”. More fundamentally, however, our approach and Halpern’s both rest
on the idea that the non-transitivity of phenomenal indiscriminability can
be made transitive by reference to a particular context, but in our approach
this contextual parameter remains implicit, thereby affording a more intuitive
characterization of the uncertainty associated to inexact knowledge.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we introduce Centered
Semantics, a non-standard semantics for modal epistemic logic, and review
how it can be combined with Williamson’s margin semantics in a way that
1A relation R is transitive if xRy and yRz imply xRz for every x, y and z. A relation
is euclidian if xRy and xRz imply yRz for every x, y, z.
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preserves the introspection principles. In Section 3, we examine the cor-
respondence with Halpern’s semantics. In Section 4, finally, we examine a
possible objection against the semantics introduced in Section 2, namely the
fact that the semantics invalidates a principle of knowledge of one’s margin
of error put forward by Williamson in his attack against the principle of pos-
itive introspection. We respond to the objection by presenting a dynamic
model of the way in which subjects with inexact knowledge make successive
approximations of their own margin of error.
2 Centered Semantics
Consider a discrete series of pens linearly ordered by size, such that all and
only pens that are less or equal to 4 cm fit in a certain box. A subject sees
the pens and the box at a certain distance and is asked which pens will fit
in the box. We make the supposition that from where she is, the subject
cannot perceptually discriminate between pairwise adjacent pens, namely
between pens whose size differs by less than 1 cm. However, the subject is
able to discriminate between non-adjacent pens.2 For instance, when looking
at the pen of size 2, the subject cannot discriminate it from the pen of size
1, nor from the pen of size 3, but she can discriminate it from a pen of size
4. Furthermore, we make the idealized assumption that the inability of the
subject to detect differences is constant throughout the series.
The scenario may be represented by means of the following linear Kripke
model, in which p represents the objective property of fitting in the box,
with worlds indexed by sizes. The important fact about the model, reflected
in the accessibility relation between worlds, is that the model is reflexive
and symmetric, but non-transitive (and non-euclidian). Letting R stand for
the relation of perceptual indicriminability, this represents the fact that the
subject does not discriminate any object from itself, nor any two adjacent
items in the series, but can indeed discriminate between any two non-adjacent
items.
0
»»
oo // 1
»»
oo // 2
»»
oo // 3
»»
oo // 4
»»
oo // 5
»»
p p p p ¬p ¬p
Figure 1: A discrete margin model
2The size unit is not relevant for the discussion, and the reader may replace centime-
ters by millimeters if it helps make the scenario more plausible. Likewise, sizes may be
translated for more plausibility (translating 0 to 18, 1 to 19 and so on).
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We use the language of propositional modal logic, where ¤ is interpreted
as a knowledge operator: ¤φ stands for: “the subject knows that φ”. We
consider the usual semantics for propositional modal logic, in which given a
Kripke model 〈W,R, V 〉, and a world w ∈ W , w |= ¤φ iff for every w′ such
that wRw′, w′ |= φ. Relative to this model, n |= ¤p means that when looking
at a pen of size n, the subject knows that it fits in the box. In the present
case, this means that when looking at a given object, the subject knows that
it has some property if and only if every object that is indiscriminable from it
has that property. Alternatively, the above model can be seen as a particular
case of what Williamson calls a fixed margin model. A fixed-margin model is
a model 〈W,d, α, V 〉, where d is a metric over W , and α a real valued margin
for error parameter, such that w |= ¤φ iff for every w′ such that d(w,w′) ≤ α,
w′ |= φ. That is, at a given world, the subject knows that some proposition
φ holds if φ holds at every world included within the margin α from w. The
above model is a discrete margin model, such that W = N and α = 1.
In the above model, for instance, 2 |= ¤p, and 3 |= ¬¤p ∧ ¬¤¬p: thus,
the subject knows that an object of size 2 will fit in the box, and does
not know whether an object of size 3 fits in the box. Crucially, however,
2 |= ¬¤¤p, that is the subject doesn’t know that he knows that the pen
fits in the box, since 4 is a ¬p-world accessible in two steps from 2. For
Williamson, this result is a welcome prediction of the model and semantics,
since iterations of knowledge operators are seen by Williamson as a “process
of gradual erosion” in the case of vague knowledge ([12]: 228). Indeed, each
iteration of knowledge is seen as a step by which a margin of error is removed.
According to Williamson, the subject knows that he knows that p only if his
knowledge is “safely safe”, namely if the epistemic context of the subject is
at least two steps away from the boundary between p and ¬p.3
However, one may argue that, looking at a pen of size 2, my knowing that
I know that it will fit in the box supervenes only on my knowing whether
it fits in the box, and not on epistemic alternatives that are further away.
One important motivation to suppose so concerns higher-order iterations of
knowledge: for instance, the standard semantics makes the prediction that
at 0 in the above model, it holds that ¤¤¤p, and yet that it is not the
case that ¤¤¤¤p. However, it is hard to make sense of such fine-grained
distinctions between levels of knowledge: indeed, if the subject knows that
she knows that she knows that the pen fits in the box, how could she fail to
know that she knows that she knows that she knows?
In [1], we formulated an alternative semantics (CS, for Centered Seman-
tics), in which the epistemic alternatives relevant for iterated modalities re-
3See [14], p. 123 on the topological understanding of the notion of safety.
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main the worlds accessible in one transition from the world of evaluation.
In other words, every fact concerning the knowledge of the agent should be
decided solely on the basis of worlds that are not distinguishable from that
world, without having to move further along the accessibility relation. Given
a model M = 〈W,R, V 〉, we first define the notion of satisfaction for couples
of worlds, and extract the definition of satisfaction for single worlds:
Definition 1. CS-satisfaction for couples of worlds:
(i) M, (w,w′) ²CS p iff w
′ ∈ V (p).
(ii) M, (w,w′) ²CS ¬φ iff M, (w, w
′) 2CS φ.
(iii) M, (w,w′) ²CS (φ ∧ ψ) iff M, (w, w
′) ²CS φ and M, (w,w
′) ²CS
ψ.
(iv) M, (w,w′) ²CS ¤φ iff for all w
′′ such that wRw”,
M, (w,w′′) ²CS φ.
Definition 2. M, w ²CS φ iff M, (w, w) ²CS φ
The use of double-indexing allows us to represent both the perspective of
the agent (through the first index, which we may call the perspective point),
and also the information relevant relative to the agent’s perspective (through
the second index, which bears the atomic information, and which we may call
the reference point).4 Satisfaction with respect to single worlds is defined by
diagonalization, namely when the perspective point and the reference point
coincide. Thus clause (iv) of Definition 1 and Definition 2 together account
for the “centered” feature of the semantics, for they entail that for every
w and w′: M, (w,w′) ²CS ¤φ iff M, (w, w) ²CS ¤φ iff M, w ²CS ¤φ. Thus,
instead of looking at worlds that are two steps away to check whether ¤¤φ is
satisfied, one backtracks to the actual world to see whether ¤φ already holds
there. In the previous model, it can be checked that 2 ²CS ¤p, and likewise
3 ²CS ¬¤p ∧ ¬¤¬p. However, 2 ²CS ¤¤p and 3 ²CS ¤¬¤p. In [1], we
proved that the normal logic K45 is indeed sound and complete with respect
to CS.5 Furthermore, one can formulate a centered version of Williamson’s
fixed-margin semantics, which we call CMS, for which the logic S5 is sound
and complete (we shall not repeat the proofs here, but refer to [1] for technical
details).
4See [2] for details on the relation of CS to other double-indexing frameworks, in par-
ticular Rabinowicz & Segerberg’s in [8]. The terminology of perspective vs reference points
is from Rabinowicz & Segerberg.
5Axiom K is ¤(p → q) → (¤p → ¤q), 4 is ¤p → ¤¤p (positive introspection) and 5
is ¬¤p → ¤¬¤p (negative introspection). S5 is the extension of K45 obtained by adding
T , namely ¤p → p.
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When ¤ is interpreted as “the subject knows that” or “I know that”, our
view is that Centered Semantics gives a more plausible view of higher-order
knowledge than the standard semantics. When the operator ¤ is interpreted
as “it is clear that”, however, as Williamson originally considered in his
Logic of Clarity, the situation may be different. In particular, the main
motivation to conceive of iterations as a process of gradual erosion is to
have an account of higher-order vagueness: the idea is that clear cases of
some property, like unclear instances, may in turn have borderline cases. For
instance, 2 |= ¤p, which under this interpretation means that 2 clearly fits
in the box, but 2 2 ¤¤p, which means that it isn’t clear that 2 clearly fits in
the box. Relative to this interpretation of the ¤, it can therefore be objected
that CS makes room only for first-order vagueness, and not for higher-order
vagueness, since “it is clear that p” systematically entails “it is clear that
it is clear that p” in CS (positive introspection), and furthermore “it is not
clear that p” systematically entails “it is clear that it is not clear that p”
(negative introspection).
To this, however, three replies can be made: firstly, when ¤ is read as
“I know that”, as we assume, ¤¬¤p should rather mean that I am aware
of my uncertainty at the moment it first arises: by analogy to situations
of “forced march” (see [6]: 173), in which I am forced to answer by “yes”
or “no” (or possibly more values) for the application of one and the same
predicate of each item in a soritical series, this means that I am aware of
making a “jump” in my judgements when the jump occurs (see e.g. [10]).6
In the present case, we could imagine that the choice is forced between “yes”,
“no” and “indeterminate”. In that case, the subject will say “yes” to “does
pen 0 fit in the box?”, and likewise for pens 1 and 2. When looking at pen 3,
however, the subject starts to hesitate: the subject then “jumps” and answers
“I’m not sure” (namely “indeterminate”). But at the moment the subject
makes this jump from “yes” to “indeterminate”, the subject presumably is
aware of making the jump: it is perfectly consistent with the scenario to
imagine that the subject knows that she doesn’t know whether 3 fits in the
box or not.
A second element of response to the problem of higher-order vagueness
concerns the fact that in [1] we show that CS is a particular case of a fam-
ily of resource-sensitive semantics called TS(n) (for “token semantics with
n tokens”), for which the trivialization of the iterations need not occur at
the first level, but at any arbitrary level n of iterated modalities, depending
on the number n of tokens available. Informally, the intuition behind To-
6A jump occurs as soon as the subject declares a difference in semantic status for two
subsequent items in the series. See [6], 173 sqq.
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ken Semantics is that moving along the accessibility relation has a cognitive
cost, which is mirrored by the fact that a token is spent for each move in
a model, and the initial number of tokens available to the agent is finite.
When all tokens have been spent, just as in CS, the agent backtracks to the
position reached before the last move, gets a token back, and can spend it
for a new move. In this framework w ²TS φ [n] means that φ holds at w
when n tokens are available to the agent (we refer to the Appendix for the
recursive definition). To take a concrete example on the previous model, the
rules of satisfaction in Token Semantics predict that: 1 ²TS ¤¤p [2], as in
the standard semantics, since all worlds reachable in two steps from 1 satisfy
p. Likewise, as in the standard case, 2 2TS ¤¤p [2]. However, we now have
that 1 ²TS ¤¤¤p [2], since with only 2 tokens, the agent cannot visit worlds
beyond 3 when her initial context is 1. It is easy to see that CS corresponds
to Token Semantics with only 1 token allowed, and standard Kripke Seman-
tics to Token Semantics with an infinite number of tokens available. More
generally, TS(n) and standard Kripke semantics coincide for formulas with
less than n embedded modalities.
Using TS(n) semantics, one can in principle account for n-order vagueness
when the ¤ operator is interpreted as “it is clear that”. But again, TS(n)
cannot be a logic of n+1-order vagueness, since in TS(n) the schema ¤np →
¤n+1p comes out as a validity (see [1] and the Appendix for technical details):
thus “it is clear (n−1 times)... that p” does not necessarily entail “it is clear
(n times) that p”, but “it is clear (n times) that p” entails that “it is clear that
it is clear (n times) that p”. The question, here, is whether one can plausibly
conceive of higher-order vagueness without being committed to higher-order
vagueness at all orders. Williamson, for instance, shows that in KTB, namely
the basic Logic of Clarity, a proposition p either is precise, or has first-order
vagueness but not higher-order vagueness, or has vagueness of all orders
([13]:136).7 However, Williamson remarks that if “B is abandoned, p can
have vagueness of all orders below n and precision thereafter for any n ≥ 1”
([13]:138). Conversely, Williamson notes that in a logic stronger than KTB,
like S5, there can be first-order vagueness without second-order vagueness.
The relevant point here is that for every n ≥ 2, TS(n) is axiomatized by a
logic weaker than K45 that fails to yield B, even when T is systematically
included. Conversely, when T and B are assumed, the resulting logic, which
includes the schema ¤np → ¤n+1p (see Appendix) is then stronger than
KTB. Either way, the resulting logic for TS(n) remains a plausible candidate
7B is the axiom p → ¤¬¤¬p. KTB axiomatizes Williamson’s fixed margin semantics.
Williamson also presents a variable margin semantics, axiomatized by the logic KT.
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for n-order vagueness.8 More fundamentally, we do consider that higher-
order vagueness running out at some finite order is plausible enough, much
for the same reasons which concern the iterations of knowledge operators.
In our view, instances of a property may become clearly clear instances at
some point, in much the same way in which a man with 0 hair on his head
is a clear cases of baldness, and a clearly clear case thereof, and so on at all
levels (see [4]).
The third remark on this problem, finally, concerns the fact that the
operators “it is clear that” and “I know that” should not be taken to be
synonymous, even when the kind of knowledge described is inexact.9 Indeed,
taking CS as a logic of inexact knowledge does not commit us to denying
higher-order vagueness, so long as the ¤ operator is interpreted as “I know
that”, and not as “it is clear that”. This point is central to Halpern’s own
approach to the representation of vagueness in epistemic logic, to which we
now turn.
3 Halpern’s semantics
Halpern takes a different approach to the problem of inexact knowledge, since
his logic makes room for distinct syntactic representations of the operators
“I know that” and “it is clear that”. His logic (in the one-agent case) has
two primitive operators, namely R and D, where Rφ means that the agent
“reports φ”, and Dφ means that “according to the agent, φ is definitely the
case”. A model, relative to this language, is a structure 〈W,P,∼s,∼o, V 〉,
where W ⊆ O × S, where S is intended to denote a set of subjective states
and O a set of objective states. The relations ∼o and ∼s both are equiva-
lence relations over W , and V is a valuation over W . P , finally, is a sub-
set of W , intended to denote the states that the agent considers plausible.
For simplicity, we shall assume that P = W here, and therefore we shall
omit reference to P in the definition of satisfaction. With that simplifica-
tion, the satisfaction clauses for the modal operators are the expected ones,
namely M, (w, v) |= Rφ iff for every (w′, v′) such that (w, v) ∼s (w
′, v′),
M, (w′, v′) |= φ, and similarly for Dφ with respect to ∼o. As a consequence,
8Williamson [13], p. 134, notes that “intuitively, there is a strong connection between
the non-transitivity of indiscriminability and higher-order vagueness”. What matters in
this respect is that while transitivity and euclidianness are invalid in TS(n) for n > 1,
weaker forms of both properties are preserved for the logic, namely n-transitivity and
n-euclidianity, as described in the Appendix.
9See [2] for further developments on this point.
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SOO
¬p
5 p ¬p ¬p
4 p p ¬p
3 p p p
2 p p p
1 p p
0 1 2 3 4 5 // O
Figure 2: A layered margin model
each operator is axiomatized by the logic S5.10 The point of Halpern’s ap-
proach, however, is that although each operator separately obeys transitivity
(and euclidianness), their combination DR need not (if two binary relations
A and B are equivalence relations, it does not follow that their composition
A ◦ B is transitive or euclidian).11 Intuitively, an agent definitely reports
that φ when his estimation is sufficiently reliable, just as in Williamson’s
approach. In this way, the complex operator (DR) plays exactly the role of
Williamson’s “clearly” operator in margin for error semantics.
To make the link concrete, let us consider a model, depicted in Figure
2, in which W is the subset of N × N consisting of couples (n,m) such that
|n − m| ≤ 1. Let us suppose that n is the objective size of some object,
or the objective value of some parameter, and m its subjective estimate.
The constraint on n and m represents the fact that the subject’s estimate
cannot deviate from more than 1 on the objective value, namely that the
subject’s margin of error is 1. Let us suppose moreover that (n,m) ∼o (n
′,m)
iff n = n′, namely if they agree on their objective indices, and likewise
(n,m) ∼s (n
′,m′) iff m = m′, namely if they agree on their subjective indices.
It is easy to verify that both relations are equivalence relations over W .
In the above figure, each cell of the partition determined by ∼o corre-
sponds to the points connected by a vertical dotted line, and each cell of
the partition determined by ∼s corresponds to the points connected by a
10In Halpern’s full version of the semantics for the multi-agent case, each modality is
actually a KD45 operator (where D is ¤¬p → ¬¤p), and for each agent the corresponding
D operator satisfies a weakened version of axiom T.
11For two binary relations A and B over W , A◦B =df {(v, w);∃u : (v, u) ∈ A∧ (u, w) ∈
B}.
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horizontal straight line. Let us suppose moreover that whether a point w
is a member of V (p) depends only on the objective part of w. For instance
suppose that (n,m) ∈ V (p) iff n < 5 (as in our previous example, p may
stand for “fitting in the box”). It is easily checked that (2, 3) |= DR p, but
(2, 3) 2 DRDR p. Thus, if the size of the object is 2 and the measurement
made by the agent is 3, with a threshold for ¬p that is between 4 and 5, then
the agent definitely reports that p, but will not iterate this judgement. By
contrast, R is an S5 modality, satisfying negative and positive introspection
at any point in the model.
In the previous model, Dp is equivalent to p. Conversely, if we consider
only the relation of subjective equivalence for R, a model like the model
of Figure 2 may be called a layered margin model, since each horizontal
equivalence class (namely the classes for ∼s) contains the possible objective
values that are compatible with the agent’s subjective parameter, and the
horizontal projection of these classes onto the O-axis of the model would
yield a linear structure of inexact knowledge of exactly the kind with which
we started. This notion of layering can be made precise. Thus, given a
Kripke model M = 〈W,R, V 〉, let us call L(M) = 〈W ′, R′, V ′〉 a layering of
M if it satisfies: W ′ = {(w, w′) ∈ W ×W ; w′Rw ∨ w′ = w}; (w, w′)R′(u, u′)
iff w′ = u′ and w′Ru; and finally, (w,w′) ∈ V ′(p) iff w ∈ V (p) (note that it is
the first index here, namely the objective index, which specifies the atomic
information, whereas in Centered Semantics the first index, or perspective
point, comes first: this explains the inversion of indices in Lemma 1 below).
It can be checked that R′ in L(M) is necessarily transitive and euclidian for
every R, and is an equivalence relation if R is reflexive. It is easy to establish
that, relative to the basic modal language in which ¤ is the single modality:
Proposition 1. M, w ²CS φ ⇐⇒ L(M), (w,w) |= φ
by proving that for all (w′, w) in L(M):
Lemma 1. M, (w, w′) ²CS φ ⇐⇒ L(M), (w
′, w) |= φ.
Proof. M, (w, w′) ²CS p iff w
′ ∈ V (p) iff (w′, w) ∈ V ′(p) iff L(M), (w′, w) |= p.
The boolean cases are immediate. M, (w,w′) ²CS ¤φ iff for every w
′′ such
that wRw′′, M, (w, w′′) ²CS φ iff, by induction hypothesis, for every w
′′ such
that wRw′′, L(M), (w′′, w) |= φ, iff, by definition of L(M), for every (u, u′)
such that (w′, w)R′(u, u′), we have L(M), (u, u′) |= φ, iff L(M), (w′, w) |= ¤φ.
Proposition 1 applies also to Williamsons’s fixed margin models M =
〈W,d, α, V 〉 (see [4]) in which two worlds w, w′ are accessible iff d(w,w′) ≤ α,
where d is a metric over W . A layered margin model necessarily is a model
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in which the induced epistemic accessibility is an equivalence relation, since
margin models are reflexive by definition of a metric between worlds. With
respect to margin models, Proposition 1 shows that Halpern’s operator R
therefore plays exactly the role of the knowledge operator ¤ in the frame-
work of centered semantics. On the one hand, these results makes clear that
centered semantics really is a standard two-dimensional semantics in dis-
guise. On the other hand, the operation of layering shows how it is possible
to recover transitivity (and euclideanness) from a non-transitive (and non-
euclidian) relation. In Halpern’s approach, the intransitivity characteristic
of qualitative comparison is simulated by means of two operators.
According to Halpern, if one conceives of epistemic accessibility relations
as indistinguishability relations, “there is a strong intuition that the indistin-
guishability relation should be transitive, as should the relation of equivalence
on preferences” ([5]: 2). Halpern’s arguments in favour of this intuition con-
verge with the arguments given independently by Fara in [3] and Raffman
in [9], in favour of the idea that perceptual indiscriminability is transitive,
despite appearances to the contrary. For Fara, in particular, the apparent
non-transitivity of “looking the same as” is due to a surreptitious shift of the
context with regard to which judgments of resemblance are made. Raffman
reaches the same conclusion as Fara, by pointing to the fact that in soritical
series, sameness is context-dependent, and that one of the same color patch
#4, for instance, may upon reflection look different in two different acts of
comparison, even though it looks the same as #3 in one context, and the
same as #5 in a different context.
The correspondence between Halpern’s approach and ours suggests that
we can perfectly agree with Halpern, Fara or Raffman on the idea that phe-
nomenal indiscriminability is transitive once it is explictly contextualized.
Indeed, in a layered margin model such as the model of Figure 2, the relation
of subjective indistinguishability is between ordered pairs with the same ob-
jective index. In the non-transitive margin model of Figure 1, by contrast,
the relation of indistinguishability is not relativized in this way. However,
when epistemic sentences are evaluated with respect to Centered Semantics
over this model, what obtains is in fact an implicit relativization of exactly
the same kind: to say that 1 is indistinguishable from 0 and from 2 (in CS)
in fact means that 1 is indistinguishable from 0 and 2 when 1 is taken as
perspective point.12
12In [2], we made this contextual effect explicit in a different way: instead of viewing
Centered Semantics as an implicit transformation of one-dimensional model into a product
model, as shown in Proposition 1, we prove that Centered Semantics can be seen as
an implicit enrichment of the underlying epistemic language by means of an actuality
operator. More precisely, what we show is that “knowing”, relative to CS, means the
11
Despite this, one could still ask which of the two indistinguishability rela-
tions should be considered as more primitive in order to describe knowledge:
should we take as primitive the transitive relation of indistinguishability of
the layered model? or rather, should it be the non-transitive relation of the
original margin model? Here Proposition 1 can be interpreted in two opposite
ways. Like Halpern, we may consider that the relation of perceptual indis-
criminability fundamentally is transitive, and that the non-transitive linear
model of Figure 1 in fact results from the transitive product model of Figure
2 (by an operation inverse to the operation of layering). On that view, the
“true” relation of indistinguishability behind the operator ¤ is the relation
R′ of the layered model, not the indistinguishability relation R of the linear
margin model. But conversely, one could interpret the situation the other
way around, and consider that the non-transitive relation R of the model of
Figure 1 is the primitive relation.
The choice between these two options depends in part on what one takes
to be the best representation of the notion of epistemic context, and then on
what one takes “perceptual” to mean when one talks of “perceptual indistin-
guishability” between contexts. The layered model of Figure 2 gives a way of
having an infinite set of distinct accessibility relations, one for each individual
context, which is equivalent in turn to defining a single accessibility relation
between richer contexts defined as ordered pairs, as in Halpern’s semantics.
In comparison, the margin model of Figure 1 gives a simpler representation of
the notion of context: on our view, this representation gives a more intuitive
rendering of the perceptual experience that subjects might have of a soritical
series (like a series of pens ordered by height, or a series of hues cleverly
shaded, and so on). The difference of granularity between the two notions of
context reflects itself in a difference between two acceptations of the notion of
“perception”. When Halpern opposes “perception about sweetness” and “re-
ports about sweetness”, for instance, Halpern understands “perceptual” in a
narrow sense, namely by reference to the subpersonal processes by which an
agent organizes his basic sensory information. The example given by Halpern
is that of a robot with sensors, whose perception of sweetness goes by unam-
biguous thresholds. By contrast, what Halpern describes as “reports about
sweetness” is supposed to correspond to the qualitative experience the robot
has of sweetness, which Halpern sees as potentially biassed and ambiguous,
leaving room for non-transitivity in discrimination. This notion of “report”
is in fact the qualitative notion of “perception” that we intend when we talk
of perceptual indistinguishability.
same as “actually knowing”, relative to a standard two-dimensional semantics in the style
of Kamp’s two-dimensional semantics for temporal logic in [7].
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There should be no misunderstanding, consequently, when we assert that
in our opinion, “perceptual indistinguishability” can be conceived as non-
transitive: by this, we have in mind exactly the kind of indistinguishability
which Halpern would associate to reports about perception. But the differ-
ence is that we can take such a non-transitive relation as primitive, without
having to match it to a complex operator in order to describe knowledge.
We do not think, therefore, that any epistemic uncertainty relation should
necessarily be transitive. Concerning introspection, however, what Proposi-
tion 1 shows is that Halpern’s approach in terms of product models and our
approach in terms of a non-standard semantics follow essentially the same in-
spiration, by making higher-order knowledge depend only on the states that
are in the immediate ken of the agent, and by avoiding spurious dependencies
to alternatives that lie beyond those on which knowledge of the first-order
supervenes.
4 Improving on the margins
So far, our approach to vagueness and introspection has been focused on
modeling issues: given that the relation of perceptual indiscriminability does
not seem to be transitive, how could we possibly recover introspection prin-
ciples? Two strategies have been discussed: either the modal semantics has
to be modified (our centered semantics), or the apparent intransitivity of the
accessibility relation has to be factored out (Halpern’s bimodal modeling).
Now, Williamson does not only repudiate introspection principles because
they do not hold in his margin for error semantics. He also offers a general
argument against introspection that is meant to be theory-free and in par-
ticular independent of Kripke-style modeling of inexact knowledge.13 What
good is Centered Semantics – or Halpern’s semantics for that matter – if
there is a semantically neutral argument against introspection?
Williamson’s argument rests on a scenario which is a quantitative vari-
ation on the pen and box situation we introduced at the beginning of this
paper. The story goes like this. Mr Magoo sees a tree in the distance. He
is pretty sure that that the tree is strictly less than k inches tall. However,
Mr Magoo’s knowledge obeys a margin for error principle: if the size of the
tree had been between k − α and k inches, he would not have been able to
tell that its size was less than k inches. We shall assume moreover that Mr
Magoo has a reflective access to his knowledge: when he knows something,
he knows that he knows it. Here is how Mr Magoo might improve on his
13We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer of our previous paper [1] for drawing our
attention to this point, which was not addressed in [1].
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woodsy knowledge (we shall use the notation [s(t) < k] for “the size of the
tree is less than k inches”; we here use K instead of ¤ for the knowledge
operator, in order to emphasize the fact that the reasoning is syntactic):
(i) K[s(t) < k], by hypothesis
(ii) K([s(t) ≥ k − η] → ¬K[s(t) ≤ k]), by reflection on the conditions of
one’s knowledge.
(iii) KK[s(t) ≤ k], by introspection and 1.
(iv) K[s(t) < k − η] by 2, 3 and closure of knowledge under logical conse-
quence.
By iterating this reasoning, we can show that Mr Magoo knows that the
size of the tree is less than k′ for arbitrary k′. This is clearly a reductio, and
therefore one has to reject:
• either (ii) and the idea that Mr Magoo can know, by reflecting on the
limitations of his visual abilities, that his margin for error is at least η
for an arbitrarily small but fixed η,
• or (iii) and the idea that when Mr Magoo knows something, he knows
that he knows it,
• or (iv) and the idea that Mr Magoo knows the logical consequence of
what he knows.
Since truth is preserved under logical consequence, it seems that Mr Magoo
can safely be assumed to be a good logician. According to Williamson, we
should moreover grant Mr Magoo the ability to reflect on his visual limita-
tions. So Williamson takes his argument as a reductio of (iii): introspection
is not compatible with situations of inexact knowledge.
According to centered semantics, and similarly according to Halpern’s bi-
modal approach (see [5], section 4.5),14 (ii) is not valid. Note that since the
logics associated with these semantics are normal, they satisfy (iv). More-
over, since they validate introspection, they satisfy (iii). The rejection of (ii)
comes therefore as no surprise. In particular, in a fixed margin model with
margin α, the principle of margin for error holds, but it does not hold that
it is known. Let us consider the natural margin model M representing Mr
Magoo’s visual experience of trees. The model is M = 〈W,d, α, V 〉. W is the
14In the following, the discussion will focus on CS rather than Halpern’s setting. Because
of the translations given in the previous section, this is no loss of generality.
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set of possible sizes of the tree, say W = R+ if the tree could be r inches tall
for any positive real number r. The distance between two worlds r and r′ is
|r − r′|. The margin α is a given number representing Mr Magoo’s inability
to distinguish between two trees whose sizes differ by less than α inches. Fi-
nally, V makes s(t) < k true at r iff r < k. [s(t) ≥ k− α] → ¬K[s(t) ≤ k] is
CS-valid on M (it is true no matter what the size of the tree is). However,
for given k and η ≤ α, K([s(t) ≥ k − η] → ¬K[s(t) ≤ k]) does not hold in
general, even with η much smaller than α.15 For example, assuming that Mr
Magoo’s margin is 50 inches, 599 6²CS K([s(t) ≥ 650−2] → ¬K[s(t) ≤ 650]),
because (599, 648) ²CS [s(t) ≥ 650 − 2] and (599, 648) ²CS K[s(t) ≤ 650]).
Thus, if the tree is 599 inches tall, CS predicts that Mr Magoo does not know
that, if the tree is more than 648 inches tall, he does not know that it is less
than 650 inches tall.
So, does Centered Semantics really makes inexact knowledge compatible
with introspection? Maybe the price to pay is too high, because CS seems to
make a very counterintuitive prediction by denying to Mr Magoo any kind
of knowledge of the limitations of his visual abilities. Similarly, Williamson
could claim that our account misses the point when it comes to addressing his
argument against introspection, because it escapes the reductio by denying
the much plausible assumption (ii). We shall now argue that Williamson’s
argument should be considered as a reductio of (ii) rather than of (iii), and
that it does make sense to model a notion of knowledge for which (ii) fails.
As Williamson himself remarks, (ii) is all the more plausible than η can
be taken to be arbitrarily small for the reductio to work. In particular η does
not have to be α itself, and actually it does not seem epistemologically right
to grant Mr Magoo the ability to know exactly his margin by mere reflection.
Thus, (ii) does not amount to knowledge of one’s margin for error: it just
amounts to an ability to assign a lower bound to one’s margin. Mr Magoo
might not have any a priori access to his own margin for error. Still it seems
that he can know by mere reflection that it is at least η, when η is reasonably
small. And this seems to be enough to make (ii) a reasonable assumption.
Or is it?
Let us make the issue more vivid. Suppose Mr Magoo engages in a
discussion with his friend, the forest warden. The tree is 599 inches tall, Mr
Magoo is not a professional, but he is not that bad at judging heights, say
his margin for error is 50 inches. Mr Magoo does know that the tree is less
than 650 inches tall, and he says so to the warden. Now the warden can ask
him whether he cannot do better than that: “come on, Mr Magoo, if the
15This is a special feature of CS. On standard Kripke semantics, if a formula φ is true
everywhere in a model, Kφ is also true everywhere in that model.
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tree was just 6 inches short of 650 inches, you could not tell me that it is no
more than 650 inches tall!” The warden is right, and Mr Magoo, following
the suggestion of his friend, engages in a reflection on the limitation of his
eyesight. Eventually, he comes to know that the warden is right. He infers,
rightly again, that the tree is less than 644 inches tall. But now his margin has
changed: it is no more 50, but only 44. What happens if Mr Magoo’s friend is
actually a Williamsonian warden and makes the same point again and again?
First, let us note that at some stage, the warden point will simply not be
right, even granting than at all the previous stages Mr Magoo is entitled to
improve on his knowledge by mere reflection. After 9 socratic rejoinders by
the warden, Mr Magoo’s margin will be no more than 50 − (9 × 6) = 5,
and it will no more be true that Mr Magoo’s margin for error is at least 6.
Hence Mr Magoo will not be entitled to improve on his woodsy knowledge
by considering that his margin is at least 6. Moreover, from an epistemic
perspective, it is clear that Mr Magoo’s ability to provide by truth-producing
reflection a lower bound for his margin for error will decrease as the warden
keeps insisting. Maybe the second time the warden asks, Mr Magoo can still
be said to be entitled to consider that his margin is at least 3, given that
his actual margin is now 44. On this scenario, the third time this process
is iterated, Mr Magoo’s margin is down to 41, and he might still be said to
be entitled to consider that his margin is at least 1. But eventually, as the
number n of iterations grows, Mr Magoo’s reflective gain becomes smaller
and smaller.
Let us go back to the abstract reasoning proposed by Williamson. A
crucial point for Williamson’s argument to go through is that it has to be
possible to find a fixed value for η which can be reused in reiterating the
inference. But, if the previous little story has it right, this is simply not
possible! Let us assume that Mr Magoo has performed Williamson’s inference
once. Now he knows that K[s(t) < k − η]. Performing the reasoning once
amounts to reducing Mr Magoo’s margin, which is now R(α) = α− η, where
the notation R(α) is meant to make explicit the functional dependency of
Mr Magoos’s reflective improvement on his visual limitations, represented by
the value α. Now the sequence α, R(α), R(R(α)), ..., Rx(α), ... has to have
a positive – presumably non-zero – lower bound: margins cannot become
negative, just as the warden cannot make his point rightly 10 times in a row,
because on the ninth time, Mr Magoo’s actual margin is less than 6. By
simple mathematics, this implies that there is no fixed value η, no matter
how small, such that we can take Rx+1(α) to be Rx(α) − η. This is why
we think that the seemingly innocent assumption (ii), and the idea that Mr
Magoo can know, by reflecting on the limitations of his visual abilities, that
his margin for error is at least η for an arbitrarily small but fixed η, should
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be rejected.16
Note that the existence of a lower bound does not contradict the weaker
assumption that Mr Magoo’s can perform Williamson’s reasoning as many
times as he wants, and that by doing so he indefinitely improves on his
knowledge. More precisely, we need not settle the question whether the limit
of the sequence is actually reached or not, i.e. whether there is an x such
that Rx(α) = Rx+1(α). In other words, we can grant to Williamson that,
at each step, it is possible to find an η such that (ii) is correct, though we
do not grant the much stronger claim that there is an η such that, at each
step, (ii) is correct. Actually, we could see how Williamson’s justification for
(ii) can be construed as supporting the weaker claim. But the unwelcome
consequence of Williamson’s original arguments seems to us to provide a
good reason to reject the stronger claim.
By definition, the sequence α,R(α), R(R(α)), ..., Rx(α), ... is monotone
decreasing, that is Rx+1(α) ≤ Rx(α). Moreover it is bounded by zero. By
simple mathematics again, it has a limit. In other words, there is an A such
that
lim
x→+∞
Rx(α) = A
Intuitively, A corresponds to the limitation of Mr Magoo’s ability to dis-
tinguish heights, given both his visual limitations and his ability to engage
himself repeatedly in the previous reflections on the limitations of his knowl-
edge. Accordingly, R(A) should be taken to be A itself: it corresponds to the
maximal amount of information that Mr Magoo is capable to extract from
his visual experience of seeing a tree in the distance. In that case, assumption
(ii) is no more an option: by construction, we have reached the point where
Mr Magoo’s ability to improve on his prior knowledge has come to an end.
These considerations vindicate our initial claims that Williamson’s argu-
ment should be considered as a reductio of (ii), and that it does make sense
to model a notion of knowledge for which (ii) fails. (ii) is faulty because the
assumption that η can be set to a fixed value is not correct. Moreover, we
can grant Williamson’s point that, starting with a given amount of purely
perceptual knowledge, Mr Magoo can gain new knowledge by reflection. But
this process reaches a limit – as we have just seen, pretty much in the math-
ematical sense of the word. Knowledge at the limit is both perceptual and
inferential: it comes from what is perceived and from (idealized) reflection on
16As the reasoning is repeated, the justifications for (ii) cannot remain the same, because
Mr Magoo’s knowledge is less and less based on perception and more and more inferential,
as his margin shrinks. As a consequence, there is no reason in the first place to assume
that η can be given a uniform value in (ii), since the justifications for the various instances
of (ii) are not themselves uniform.
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perceptual limitations. And for this notion of knowledge at least, the failure
of all instances of (ii) even for very small values of η is perfectly reasonable,
precisely because, by hypothesis, we consider what the agent can be said to
know on account that he has maximally exploited her ability to reflect on
her perceptual limitations.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have compared three different models of inexact knowledge
in epistemic logic. The first is Williamson’s model, which rests on non-
transitive and non-euclidian relations but invalidates positive and negative
introspection. A second model is Halpern’s explicit two-dimensional logic, in
which non-transitive (and non-euclidian) relations of epistemic uncertainty
are conceived as the product of more basic transitive relations. Our ap-
proach, finally, while close in spirit to Halpern’s approach, can be seen to
provide a compromise between his approach and that of Williamson, since
by modifying the semantics, it allows us to preserve introspection directly
over non-transitive models. Fundamentally, as we have seen, Halpern’s ac-
count and ours agree on the idea that knowledge can be inexact and yet
support standard introspection principles. From a conceptual point of view,
however, Centered semantics is a way of implicitly contextualizing relations
of epistemic indiscriminability characteristic of vagueness. Moreover, while
Centered Semantics arguably gives a model of first-order vagueness without
higher-order vagueness, we have seen that it belongs to a natural hierarchy
of semantics for finite higher-order vagueness.
In the last part of this paper, we have seen that our semantics, like
Halpern’s, does not allow the agent to know her margin for error system-
atically, on pain of contradiction. Williamson’s argument, as we construe
it, shows that it is not an accidental feature of Centered Semantics or of
Halpern’s bimodal system. However, this does not mean that we do not
grant the agent the ability to reflect on the limitations of her perceptual
apparatus and to approximate her margins for error. Rather, our point is
that this process is to be conceived as a dynamic process of more and more
refined approximations, which will eventually reach a limit, precisely because
each step of reflection on one’s margin is likely to be a step that withdraws
from the initial margin. We have not yet provided a formal rendering of the
process by which an agent gains new knowledge by reflecting on her margins.
Dynamic logic would be the natural tool for doing so, however, since starting
from purely perceptual data, the agent would update her prior knowledge
by approximations of her margin for error, until she reaches a fixed point
corresponding to a stable state of knowledge.
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Appendix: Token Semantics
Token Semantics is a generalization of Centered Semantics by which only
worlds that are n steps away from the actual world can be visited for a given
n. In Token Semantics, the evaluation of a formula is parameterized by a
number n of tokens: each move along the accessibility relation costs one
token, and once all tokens have been spent, no worlds that are essentially
further away can be accessed.
Formally, satisfaction is defined with respect to a sequence of worlds and
a number of tokens: q is short for an arbitrary sequence of worlds, qw for
an arbitrary sequence augmented with w, and n is an arbitrary number of
tokens.
Definition 3. Token satisfaction:
(i) M, qw ²TS p [n] iff w ∈ V (p).
(ii) M, qw ²TS ¬φ [n] iff M, qw 2TS φ [n].
(iii) M, qw ²TS (φ ∧ ψ) [n] iff M, qw ²TS φ [n] and M, qw ²TS
ψ [n].
(iv) M, qw ²TS ¤ψ [n] iff
• n 6= 0 and for all w′ such that wRw′, qww′ ²TS ψ [n− 1]
• Or n = 0 and q ²TS ¤ψ [1].
Definition 4. Let n be such that 1 ≤ n ≤ ω (we assume ω − 1 = ω).
TS(n) is the modal semantics defined by the following satisfaction relation:
M, w ²TS(n) φ iff M, w ²TS φ [n].
By definition, a formula is TS(n)-valid if it is TS(n)-true at every world
of every model. CS is equivalent to TS(1), and standard Kriple semantics is
equivalent to TS(ω).
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We have seen that CS validates (4) and (5). Similarly, TS(n) validates
the following schemata:
(4n) ¤np → ¤n¤p
(5n) ♦np → ♦n−1¤♦p
where ¤n is short for ¤...¤, n times. In [1] we provide a complete axiom-
atization for the semantics TS(n), which rests on a strengthened version of
the axioms (4n) and (5n). With respect to standard Kripke semantics, these
strengthened schemas axiomatize the class of n-transitive and n-euclidian
frames, where an n-transitive frame is a frame satisfying:
∀x1, ..., xn+2 ((x1Rx2 ∧ ... ∧ xn+1Rxn+2) → xnRxn+2)
and an n-euclidian frame is a frame satisfying:
∀x1, ..., xn+2 ((x1Rx2 ∧ ... ∧ xnRxn+1 ∧ xnRxn+2) → xn+2Rxn+1)
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